

OO WTEB HYANNIS

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FROM BUNDY

TO GENERAL MCHUGH FOR PRESIDENT AND MR SORENSEN
CITE CAP5542-62

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(H) AND 11

NUK-75-100

BY SKF NARS. DATE 12/3/77

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DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS FOR MCCLOY:

NOVEMBER 23, 1962

YOU SHOULD SEE KUZNETSOV PROMPTLY TO DISCUSS NEXT STEPS IN EFFECTING UNDERSTANDING OF OCTOBER 27 AND 28. YOU SHOULD BEGIN BY EMPHASIZING OUR DESIRE THAT THIS BE WOUND UP VERY PROMPTLY, A DESIRE CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV EVIDENTLY SHARES. WAYS AND MEANS OF ENDING MATTER SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THIS REQUIREMENT.

YOU SHOULD GIVE KUZNETSOV OUR DRAFT DECLARATION (REVISED TEXT OF FINAL PARAGRAPH IN NEXT MESSAGE) AND EXPLAIN IT TO HIM AS THE MOST WE CAN DO -- AND MORE THAN WAS ORIGINALLY PROMISED -- IN THE LIGHT OF CUBAN REFUSAL TO PERMIT UN VERIFICATION OR SAFEGUARDS. YOU SHOULD REQUEST PROMPT STUDY AND RESPONSE. AT THE SAME TIME YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT A LONG AND FRUITLESS HAGGLE IN THE UN OVER DIFFERENCES WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY EXIST BETWEEN WHAT THEY WOULD LIKE AND WHAT WE WOULD LIKE, PARTICULARLY SINCE SOME OF THESE DIFFERENCES MAY WITHER AWAY OVER TIME IF THINGS GO WELL. SUCH A HAGGLE IS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST EITHER. IF OUR STATEMENT IS ONE WHICH THEY COULD NOT LIVE WITH IN UN, WE BELIEVE A SATISFACTORY WINDUP CAN BE OBTAINED BY USE OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, AS IN LAST PRESS CONFERENCE, WHICH SOVIETS CAN READILY INTERPRET AS PROMISED ASSURANCE AGAINST INVASION. WE NOTE WITH INTEREST CHAIRMAN'S LAST MESSAGE WHICH DOES INDEED INTERPRET PRESIDENT'S LASTPRESS CONFERENCE IN THIS WAY.

OF INVASION OF CUSA, BUT THAT WE CANNOT BE PUT IN POSITION
OF GIVING A BLANKET GUARANTEE TO A MAN WHO HAS REFUSED
TO COOPERATE WITH UN TO FULFILL UNDERSTANDING OF OCTOBER
27 AND 28.

IF KUZNETSOV'S INITIAL RESPONSE IS COOL, YOU MAY WISH
TO PRESS THE POINT THAT EXCHANGES BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND
CHAIRMAN SHOW NO SUCH SOVIET POSITION AND THAT IT MAY BE
HELPFUL FOR KUZNETSOV AND PERHAPS MIKOYAN TO SEE PRESIDENT IN
WASHINGTON EARLY NEXT WEEK SO THAT NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW
YORK WILL NOT GET OUT OF PHASE WITH PROMISING EXCHANGES
BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

IF KUZNETSOV PRESSES CARIBBEAN INSPECTION SCHEME
YOU SHOULD EXPRESS READINESS TO DISCUSS THIS POINT
OUT AGAIN THAT ANY INSPECTION OF U.S. WOULD REQUIRE INSPECTION
OF USSR. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THESE MATTERS CAN WELL BE
DISCUSSED AT GENEVA IN CONNECTION WITH NEGOTIATION ON
SURPRISE ATTACK. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A COMPLEX PROBLEM
GOING WELL BEYOND INITIAL UNDERSTANDING AND REQUIRING
LONG DISCUSSION. THEREFORE WE SHOULD NOT HOLD UP ALL
EXCHANGES OF ASSURANCES PENDING SUCH AN AGREEMENT BUT
SHOULD PROMPTLY DO THE BEST WE CAN IN THE LIGHT OF CASTRO'S
POSITION AND MOVE ON TO OTHER ISSUES. WE OF COURSE HAVE
SERENE AND UNBOUNDED CONFIDENCE IN YOUR ABILITY TO PERSUADE
KUZNETSOV THAT OUR DRAFT DECLARATION IS AN IDEAL SOLUTION

DTG: 23/2013Z NOV 1962

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